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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RULE OF LAW PROMOTION 
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: BUILDING 
A RULE OF LAW CONSTITUENCY
Nedim HogiÊ *
Abstract: This paper deals with the failures in the promotion of the rule 
of law in the six countries of the Western Balkans that are in different 
stages of their EU accession process. Drawing on concrete examples 
from more than two decades of rule of law promotion through the en-
largement circles, the paper identifi es the different evolutionary stag-
es of this undertaking. It fi nds that the current dominant paradigm of 
rule of law conditionality concerning the benchmarking of progress in 
the areas of Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis fails to tackle state cap-
ture as the main structural obstacle to the rule of law in the Western 
Balkans. The paper proposes that this situation is to be improved by 
re-imagining rule of law promotion as an effort focused not merely on 
standards but on building a rule of law constituency. Four different 
approaches to rule of law promotion that have been less frequently 
used so far are offered: legal mobilisation, institutional strengthening, 
the politicisation of anti-corruption, and economic development. The 
paper concludes with refl ections on the realistic reach of the proposed 
interventions into efforts to promote the rule of law, arguing that while 
imperfect they remain necessary in order for the project to succeed.
Keywords: European Union, rule of law promotion, Western Balkans, 
corruption, economic development.
1 Introduction
The process of the integration of the WB6 countries (Albania, Ko-
sovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
into the European Union (EU) has been a lengthy political, legal, and 
economic transition. Offi cially, it began in 2003 with the commitment to 
an enlargement perspective for the WB6 countries made by the EU at the 
Thessaloniki Summit.1 From that point on, the process has experienced 
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isa.it. ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9184-5567. The author would like to thank the editors, two 
anonymous reviewers, as well as Tom Ginsburg, Giuseppe Martinico, Tena Prelec, Jelena 
Dzankic and other participants of the seminar ‘The EU and the National Legal Systems of 
the Western Balkans’ for their comments that have greatly improved the original draft of 
this paper. DOI: 10.3935/cyelp.16.2020.377.
1 European Council, Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003. Presidency con-
clusions, 11638/03. Brussels, 1 October <www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20847/76279.
pdf> accessed 29 May 2020. It should be observed that in 2003 the commitment from both 
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many highs and lows, but none so dramatic as the 2019 veto by French 
President Macron of the proposal of the European Commission to open 
accession negotiations between the EU and North Macedonia and Alba-
nia. Heavily criticised, the veto was understood to deprive the countries 
of their European future. However, much less attention has been given 
to a part of Macron’s statement that referred to these countries as imple-
menting EU legislation without transforming. What this implies is that 
the process of exporting the principles of democracy, rule of law, and a 
free-market economy has failed to bring about changes to the legal and 
political systems of the countries that were to prepare them for EU mem-
bership.
Historically, the progress of countries towards full membership in 
the EU was to ‘depend on the performance of the countries themselves in 
a wide range of reforms of their economies, standards of democracy, hu-
man rights, good governance and respect for rule of law’.2 These were the 
so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ against which the progress made by the 
states should be measured. Transposition of the chapters of the acquis 
− the EU legislation governing a certain fi eld − into domestic legislation 
and the enforcement of this legislation was the key domain of progress. 
But for most analysts writing about the process, the lack of transforma-
tion that President Macron referred to was defi ned as a combination of 
the EU’s unwillingness to promote the principles of rule of law and de-
mocracy and the rising authoritarian trends of the national governments 
in the WB6 countries.3 The EU’s focus, instead, was the stability of the 
region. This approach in which the EU favoured stability supporting the 
governments of the WB6 while turning a blind eye to a standstill in de-
velopment and even backsliding of democracy and rule of law standards 
was dubbed ‘stabilitocracy’.4 
The consequences of ‘stabilitocracy’ in the domain of democratic 
backsliding were hardly a problem specifi c for the WB6. The erosion of 
the rule of law in Poland and Hungary exposed both the weaknesses of 
the EU and the Western Balkans countries also included Croatia which joined the EU in 
2013.
2 ibid.
3 Marko Kmezic, EU Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans (Rou-
tledge 2016); Jelena Dzankic, Soeren Keil and Marko Kmezic (eds), The Europeanisation 
of the Western Balkans (Springer 2019); Arolda Elbasani, ‘Untangling Europeanization, 
Compliance and Reform in the Western Balkans: The Missing Link of Domestic Resistance 
and Accountability’ in Vladimir Vuckovic and Vladimir Djordjevic (eds), Balkanizing Euro-
peanization: Fight against Corruption and Regional Relations in the Western Balkans (Peter 
Lang 2019); Florian Bieber, The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2020).
4 Florian Bieber, ‘Patterns of Competitive Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans’ (2018) 
34(3) East European Politics 337.
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the judicial system and the loss of constituency in support of the rule 
of law among citizens. The European Commission’s (Commission) Rule 
of Law Framework, the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) in the case of Polish judges (C-619/18), and the Commis-
sion’s recent plans for further strengthening the rule of law within the 
Union all recognise the need to act in this regard. A recent Commission 
communication makes clear that there is a recognised need to build a 
rule of law constituency.5
In this paper, I do not challenge the narrative that explains the 
emergence or the consequences of ‘stabilitocracy’. This concept is both 
accurate and useful, for it points out the value of political will for the 
promotion, acceptance, and enforcement of the rule of law.6 Instead, I 
aim to look critically at the promotion of the rule of law as part of the en-
largement process, attempting to offer ideas for its reconceptualisation. 
Scholars who have researched this process have argued that it was con-
taminated by the EU’s pathological power7 and lack of true commitment 
to the rule of law,8 which enabled the strengthening of regimes blind to 
the violation of human rights but favourable to stability.9 However, what 
seems to be missing from the debate is a clear conceptualisation of the 
ways of promoting the rule of law and a clear alternative to the current 
model. Relying on ideas that have appeared as alternatives to offi cial EU 
policies,10 this paper aims to bridge this gap and offer an alternative to 
5 Commission, ‘Communication: Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union. 
State of play and possible next steps’ COM(2019) 163 fi nal. 
6 For the value of the concept of political will in rule of law interventions, see Linn Hammer-
gren, ‘Political Will, Constituency Building, and Public Support in Rule of Law Programs’ 
(1998) Center for Democracy and Governance 216. For a more general discussion of the 
concept for rule of law promotion, see Thomas Carothers (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law 
Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Brookings Institution Press 2010).
7 Martin Mendelski, ‘The EU’s Pathological Power: The Failure of External Rule of Law Pro-
motion in South Eastern Europe’ (2015) 39(3) Southeastern Europe 318.
8 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the 
Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 8(10) European 
Integration Online Papers 1.  
9 Beata Huszka, ‘Human Rights on the Losing End of EU Enlargement: The Case of Serbia’ 
(2018) 56(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 352.
10 ‘Hamster in the Wheel: Credibility and EU Balkan Policy’ (2020) European Stability In-
itiative <www.esiweb.org/sites/default/fi les/reports/pdf/ESI%20-%20Hamster%20in%20
the%20Wheel%20-%2015%20January%202020.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020; Jovana Ma-
rovic, Marko Kmezic and Tena Prelec, Strengthening the Rule of Law in the Western Balkans: 
Call for a Revolution against Particularism (2019) BiEPAG <http://biepag.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/Strengthening-the-Rule of law.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020 35-37; Kurt 
Bassuener and others, ‘The EU Must Shift Out of Neutral in Its Enlargement Strategy: 
Championing Liberal Values Means Choosing Sides’ (2019 Democratization Policy Council) 
<www.democratizationpolicy.org/pdf/DPC_Policy_Note_Enlargement_Strategy_Shift.pdf> 
accessed 30 May 2020.
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the status quo that seems content with gradual incremental reforms to 
the legal systems. It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a fully de-
veloped theory of change that would guarantee success in the promotion 
of the rule of law. Instead, the paper offers a set of measures that, taken 
together, could lead to a strengthening of rule of law constituencies in 
the WB6 countries.
The paper proceeds by explaining the evolution of the rule of law 
promotion and conditionality in the process of European enlargement 
from the big-bang enlargement of 2004 to the current situation. It expla-
ins the specifi c challenges to the rule of law promotion that exist in the 
WB6 countries and offers specifi c examples of some of the key aspects of 
both the challenges to rule of law promotion and the promotion strate-
gies that were offered by the EU in the interplay with local actors. I argue 
that specifi c policy failures have been unable to prevent state capture. 
Instead, they have encouraged fake compliance and rule of law reduced 
to an exercise of discursive practice of European offi cials. In the third 
part, the paper proposes some alternative, less used avenues for enga-
gement in rule of law promotion. Specifi cally, I argue that these avenues 
can lead to the creation of a rule of law constituency which could be 
able to counter state capture as the main obstacle to achieving rule of 
law standards. I conclude that the success of the EU’s future role in the 
promotion of the rule of law depends heavily on its ability to identify and 
motivate a constituency that would fully participate in such a project. 
While the paper is prospective, primarily oriented towards the future, it 
draws on examples of the previous enlargement cycles which is why it 
revisits both the successes and failures of these undertakings in order 
to identify successful practices for strengthening the rule of law and pin-
pointing practices to be (re-)deployed.
2 The challenges of rule of law promotion in the WB6
2.1 Gradual evolution of the EU’s rule of law conditionality in the 
enlargement process
The latest set of opinions dealing with the accession of the WB6 
countries (Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Bo-
snia and Herzegovina) to the European Union (EU) was released in June 
2019.11 These opinions identify the defi ciencies in the rule of law and 
democratic accountability as among the main reasons why the enlarge-
ment by only two countries, namely Serbia and Montenegro, may happen 
before 2025 and why the accession of the other four is unlikely before 
11 The opinions as well as the EU Western Balkans Strategy can be found at <https://
ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/package_en> accessed 29 May 2020. 
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2030. Coming after 16 years of rule of law promotion projects, such a 
view raises the question: what state of rule of law should be present be-
fore the WB6 states are deemed acceptable for EU accession? And how 
should the rule of law then be cultivated in these countries? 
But to answer this question, we should fi rst address the issue of 
what conception of rule of law was promoted and how. The answer is 
much clearer with regards to the how than the what. The how was to be 
fostered through countless technical projects, fi nanced by both the EU 
and its Member States, through the secondment of experts, the training 
of civil service and judicial staff, the implementation of best practices, 
the adoption of legal standards and diplomatic efforts, and the usage of 
the rule of law. Depending on the time of their deployment, the practi-
ces had three main similar, yet different, focuses. The fi rst was what I 
call the institutional approach, focused chiefl y on institution building, 
which characterised the big-bang enlargement of 2004. Despite signifi -
cant warnings of its shortcomings in the progress reports as well as in 
academic articles, this approach, in a relatively short time (1998−2004), 
led to the accession of eight countries. The second approach, which I 
call ‘rule of law and the fi ght against corruption’, did not lose sight of 
institution building, but focused on the specifi c anti-corruption actions 
against those charged with political corruption. This model was chara-
cteristic of the enlargement of the EU to Bulgaria and Romania in 200712 
and Croatia in 2013.13 Its legacy becomes obvious when we compare the 
progress reports of any of the countries that joined in the 2004 wave of 
expansion with the progress reports of any of the WB6 countries as there 
is a signifi cant increase in attention paid to the specifi c activities of rule 
of law and the fi ght against corruption.14 Finally, the current modus ope-
randi focuses on benchmarking specifi c progress concerning rule of law 
standards and indicators.15 What made this model so different was the 
realisation that Chapters 23 and 24 of the acquis must become central 
in the Europeanisation process and that future progress of the country 
towards EU accession must depend, fi rst and foremost, on this criteri-
12 Kmezic (n 3).
13 Arolda Elbasani and Senada Selo Sabic, ‘Rule of Law, Corruption and Democratic Ac-
countability in the Course of EU Enlargement’ (2018) 25(9) Journal of European Public 
Policy 1317.
14 For example, the 2002 country report on Slovakia dedicates fi ve pages to the judicial 
system and fi ght against corruption. The 2018 opinions on Serbia and Bosnia dedicate ten 
and thirteen pages respectively.
15 Kmezic (n 3) 13-15. For an example of specifi c benchmarks concerning a legal system, 
see Dragana Lukic, ‘EU Accession Negotiations: Analysis of Benchmarks for Montenegro 
through Comparison with Croatia and Serbia’ (2015) Ministry for European Affairs of Mon-
tenegro.
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on.16 Thus, specifi c progress concerning progress was to be measured 
through the milestones that the countries pass in the establishment of 
rule of law standards.
An overview of this evolution demonstrates that the EU did not ad-
here to a strict defi nition of the rule of law. As Nikolaidis observes,17 this 
was perhaps a wise choice: by limiting itself to one conception of a term 
that is so disputed yet so widely used, the EU would unnecessarily limit 
its manoeuvring space. This evolution shows that the EU was willing to 
learn from its mistakes and impose stricter conditionality as a result of 
increased awareness of the fragility of rule of law entrenchment. It also 
demonstrates a paradox; the more robust and nuanced its approach to 
rule of law promotion became, the less success it achieved, bringing nei-
ther enlargement nor strengthening of rule of law standards. 
Figure 1. Evolution of rule of law standards regarding candidate countries
Candidate countries
Main approach to rule of 
law promotion




Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus 
(joined in 2004)
Institution building Thin and formal
Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia (joined between 
2007 and 2013)
Institution building + ‘Rule 
of law and fi ght against 
corruption’
Thin, but less formal
WB6 (began negotiating 
between 2005 and 2014, 
expected to join in 2025, at 
the earliest)18
Institution building + 
‘Rule of Law and Fight 
Against Corruption’ + 
Benchmarking
Thick and informal
This robustness of the current rule of law conditionality that is now 
crucial for assessing the progress of candidate countries needs to be 
explained in some detail. Several factors have driven such a development. 
First, the Co-operation and Verifi cation Mechanism (CVM), a monitoring 
tool developed for tracking the progress of Romania and Bulgaria in their 
16 Wolfgang Nozar, ‘The 100% Union: The Rise of Chapters 23 and 24’ (2012) 15(3) Clingen-
dael-Netherlands Institute of International Relations 14.
17 Kalypso Nicolaidis and Rachel Kleinfeld, ‘Rethinking Europe’s “Rule of Law” and En-
largement Agenda’ (2012) SIGMA Paper No 49 <sigmaweb.org/publicationsdocuments/sig-
ma_sp49_061112_Eng.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020.
18 In accordance with the EU Western Balkans Strategy (n 11).
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fi ght against corruption, was deemed insuffi cient for improving the con-
ditions for the establishment of the rule of law. The second factor  was 
the overall negative trends in democratic backsliding which led to what 
is now an acknowledged rule of law crisis within the EU.19 One of the 
sources of this crisis was found to lie in the fake compliance with rule 
of law standards that was widespread in the accession process of Roma-
nia and Bulgaria.20 Considerations over  whether their accession could 
have been managed more effi ciently21 led the EU to put even greater fo-
cus on how the institutions behave and to neglect many of the positive 
developments that preceded or countered democratic backsliding in the 
new EU Member States. For example, the rise of populism did not go un-
checked; the judiciary, especially in Poland where the political support 
for the measures undertaken by the regime was also lower, mounted a 
response that at least limited the extent of state capture and did much 
to preserve its integrity. The populist surge in Poland and Hungary did 
not come from the weakness of the legal order but was a direct result of 
the populist backlash against the liberal order22 and the weakness of the 
mainstream political parties to respond to the fi nancial crisis of 2008.23 
Far from a lost cause, the fi ght against corruption in Romania has led 
to anti-corruption prosecutions becoming a major source of political di-
vision between the parties.24 And in Bulgaria, while the anti-corruption 
record remains uneven, the efforts made have exposed the complexity of 
contextual approaches to anti-corruption.25 
Finally, the third development that created specifi c conditions for 
the application of the evolving EU conditionality was so-called ‘enlar-
gement fatigue’, a term used to describe a decline in the support of EU 
19 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Demographic Backsliding and the Rule of Law’ (2018) 44 Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 351.
20 Gergana Noutcheva, ‘Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU’s Nor-
mative Power in the Western Balkans’ (2009) 16 Journal of European Public Policy 1065.
21 Georgi Gotev, ‘Romania and Bulgaria Were Not Ready for Accession, EU Auditors Con-
fess’ (EURACTIV, 13 September 2016) <www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/au-
ditors-romania-and-bulgaria-were-not-ready-for-accession> accessed 29 May 2020.
22 Eric A Posner, ‘Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash’ (2017) 49 Arizona 
State Law Journal 795.
23 Bojan Bugaric and Alenka Kuhelj, ‘Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of law in 
Danger?’ (2018) 10(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 21.
24 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Explaining Eastern Europe: Romania’s Italian-Style Anticorrup-
tion Populism’ (2018) 29(3) Journal of Democracy 104.
25 Roxana Bratu, Dimitri A Sotiropoulos and Maya Stoyanova, ‘Through the Lens of Social 
Constructionism: The Development of Innovative Anti-Corruption Policies and Practices in 
Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, 2000−2015’ (2017) 95(1) Slavonic & East European Review 
117. But, see Maria Popova, ‘Why Doesn’t the Bulgarian Judiciary Prosecute Corruption?’ 
(2012) 59(5) Problems of Post-Communism 35.
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citizens and policymakers to the EU’s enlargement process.26 While not 
having a direct impact on rule of law standards as such, it had one very 
practical consequence for the enlargement process. Unlike the previous 
enlargements (apart from that of Croatia and the one proposed for Tur-
key) that were to happen over a defi ned timeframe, the accession of the 
WB6 might last for an indefi nite period. While this gave the EU time to 
build domestic constituency in support of enlargement, it meant that a 
sense of urgency with regard to both demand for and supply of the re-
forms that was present in the previous enlargements was lost.
2.2 The specifi c WB6 circumstances for rule of law promotion 
The rule of law was part of the liberal democratic package of values 
that also included democracy, civil society, and capitalism that was pro-
moted and established in the Central and Eastern European Member 
States from the 1990s onwards. Coming from communist dictatorship 
and post-confl ict backgrounds, the rule of law and its promotion enjoyed 
widespread support in both public opinion and in the acts of the EU, 
and the candidate countries and the WB6 countries were no exception 
to this rule. 
But the consequences of the war confl ict of the 1990s meant that 
no true efforts at democratisation would start before 2000 and that EU 
commitment towards the European future of the WB6 would only come 
in 2003. Although the rule of law promotion efforts started even ear-
lier through support for civil society organisations and some immediate 
post-war state-building (in particular in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herze-
govina), the main differentia specifi ca of the rule of law promotion effort 
was investment in building local war crimes prosecution capacities. The-
se efforts, coupled with a gradual decrease in the political importance 
of war crimes prosecutions, resulted in the successful prosecution of 
thousands of those responsible for war crimes.27 Thus, the prosecution 
of war crimes is no longer a major challenge to the establishment of the 
rule of law in the WB6, but it drained considerably both domestic and 
EU resources that would have been useful, as was the case with the 
candidate countries that joined the EU in 2004, in tackling other rule of 
law challenges.28 
26 John O’Brennan, ‘On the Slow Train to Nowhere: the European Union, Enlargement Fa-
tigue and the Western Balkans’ (2014) 19 European Foreign Affairs Review 221.
27 Aleksandar IvanoviÊ and Lars Soltvedt, ‘Investigating and Prosecuting War Crimes in the 
Western Balkans’ (2016) 18(2) Varstvoslovje: Journal of Criminal Justice & Security 133.
28 While one could argue that other legacies of war such as the lack of recognition between 
Serbia and Kosovo or the complex constitutional power-sharing mechanisms in Bosnia 
were a burden on the rule of law promotion process, I see them as nonviolent confl icts that 
may fuel national hatred but are non-essential to the rule of law promotion process as such. 
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But legal certainty, predictability, and the use of law to construct a 
social order29 were more than just empty formal legality and were featu-
res of the law in the communist countries. This made the transition to 
the acquis and other elements of legal modernisation post-1990s easier. 
The main challenge to the rule of law reforms was the part of commu-
nist legacy hostile to the principle of separation of powers, especially 
the understanding that the judiciary should operate free of any political 
interference.30 In addition to the lack of a proper tradition of separation 
of powers, the development of the party system restrained the develop-
ment of the rule of law. Free and fair elections, often with strong inter-
national monitoring, were unable to prevent the emerging partitocracy 
that was fuelled by privatisation and poverty. The privatisation of public 
companies became a major source of corruption as the companies were 
in many instances sold at prices below their worth to persons who su-
pported the warring factions of the 1990s31 or, in cases when they were 
not privatised, used as sources for the employment of party cadres.32 In 
some instances, the political actors have used the employees of public 
companies for participation in staged protests, as part of digital trolling 
machines,33 and for the extortion of resources for funding political cam-
paigns.34 We should add to all this the dimension of economic develop-
ment; the WB6 states are the poorest part of Europe (save for Moldova 
and some regions in Bulgaria) and the state has remained an important 
employer. Within such a context it is not diffi cult to see why the politi-
cal actors operating a vast network of patronage would have a motive to 
oppose enlargement or to block the successful implementation of rule of 
law reforms. This would counter the effectiveness of the state capture 
29 Brian Tamanaha, ‘A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil 
Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 3.
30 In this sense, the remnants of old socialist law continue to haunt the former commu-
nist states that are now EU members. See Jaakko Husa, ‘Developing Legal System, Legal 
Transplants and Path Dependence’ (2018) 6(2) Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 129, 
147-149. 
31 Roberto Belloni and Francesco Strazzari, ‘Corruption in Post-Confl ict Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na and Kosovo: A Deal Among Friends’ (2014) 35(5) Third World Quarterly 855; Fernando 
Casal Bértoa and Dane Taleski, ‘Regulating Party Politics in the Western Balkans: The Legal 
Sources of Party System Development in Macedonia’ (2016) 23(3) Democratization 545.
32 ‘Managing Public Companies: Party Before Expertise’ (Centre for Investigative Journal-
ism 2018) <www.cin.ba/en/upravljanje-javnim-preduzecima-stranka-prije-struke/> ac-
cessed 29 May 2020.
33 Daniel Bush, ‘Fighting Like a Lion for Serbia: An Analysis of Government-Linked In-
fl uence Operations in Serbia’ (2020 Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center) 
<https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/serbia_march_twitter.pdf> ac-
cessed 29 May 2020.
34  Marovic, Kmezic and Prelec (n 10); Marko KmeziÊ, ‘Rule of Law and Democracy in the 
Western Balkans: Addressing the Gap Between Policies and Practice’ (2020) 1 Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 1.
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project that they were pursuing.35 It was state capture that emerged as 
the most signifi cant factor impeding rule of law reforms and general EU 
conditionality in the Western Balkans.36 
On the other hand, one of the major successes the EU has achieved 
in the WB6 is that there is no credible political force opposing enlarge-
ment.37 Despite the infl uence in the region of other countries, such as 
Russia, China, Turkey, and the United States, there is no other viable 
long-term political project that could be compared to EU accession in 
terms of its potential for political and economic development or moder-
nisation. The economy of the WB6 region remains strongly connected 
to the EU economy38 and EU conditionality remains both a leverage to 
infl uence policies and a constraint on decision-making in the countries.
2.3 The move from the acquis to substance 
The EU enlargement agenda gradually evolved to encompass more 
and more features. What started out in the wave of enlargement of the 
2000s with a focus on the adoption of the acquis has now become a 
plethora of conditionality commitments stemming from various interna-
tional legal principles and sources. This is because early EU rule of law 
promotion focused on the acquis, and the acquis itself provided uneven 
guidance related to many questions indirectly related to the rule of law. 
For example, if we take the issue of the management of publicly owned 
companies, the acquis demanded the independence of electricity-produ-
cing companies and their separation from the regulators of the market, 
as well as full liberalisation of the market in electricity and gas,39 but it 
35 Soeren Keil, ‘The Business of State Capture and the Rise of Authoritarianism in Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia’ (2018) 42(1) Southeastern Europe 59.
36 Cf Solveig Richter and Natascha Wunsch ‘Money, Power, Glory: The Linkages between 
EU Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans’ (2020) 27(1) Journal of Eu-
ropean Public Policy 41.
37 For an evolution of the alignments of political parties in the WB6 with regards to Eu-
ropean integration, see Milada A Vachudova, ‘Political Parties and Democratic Change in 
the Western Balkans: When Do External Actors Change Agendas?’ (2011) <www.research-
gate.net/profi le/Milada_Vachudova/publication/228212539_Political_Parties_and_Dem-
ocratic_Change_in_the_Western_Balkans_When_Do_External_Actors_Change_Agendas/
links/00463530b67d12d109000000.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020. For an overview of atti-
tudes of citizens of WB6 countries, see ‘Balkan Barometer’ (Regional Co-operation Council 
2019) 37-38 <www.rcc.int/seeds/fi les/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2019.pdf> 
accessed 29 May 2020.
38 Milica UvaliÊ, ‘Economic Integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union: 
The Role of EU Policies’ in Dzankic, Keil and Kmezic (n 3). 
39 The so-called ‘Third energy package’ of the EU legislative and policy framework guid-
ing management of companies in the fi elds of gas and electricity is available at <https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-consumers/market-legislation/third-ener-
gy-package> accessed 29 May 2020.
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did not offer a clear model for restructuring public companies or their 
separation from undue political infl uence. Such an approach is under-
standable; the acquis is, after all, a set of EU laws and not a compilation 
of best practices for privatisation or for the management of public assets. 
But this ensured that the process of focusing on rule of law reforms 
contained a few blind spots that were impossible to detect should one 
choose to focus solely on the acquis. Since the EU itself never clearly de-
fi ned the rule of law − considering it to be a meta principle on which the 
EU was founded40 − it never scrutinised any of the ‘old Member States’ 
in this regard.41 In order to resolve this problem, the EU fi nanced many 
independent observers, mostly coming from civil society organisations 
that were to identify these shortcomings and report on the situation. But 
even when taken up by the EU representatives, these recommendations 
often lacked the normative pull of the acquis rules. The same fate befell 
the recommendations made by other experts that often argued against 
evaluations and reports made by the EU experts.42 Therefore, the blind 
spots in the acquis coupled with the EU’s lack of an innovative strategy 
to overcome them left management of public companies as a useful asset 
for state capture in the WB6.
Instead of working on a specifi c measure to counter this threat, the 
EU focused on strengthening conditionality. This meant the application of 
two things that I have previously referred to: the prominence of Chapters 
23 and 24 in the negotiation process, and the introduction of benchmar-
king.43 Defi ning a set of indicators or milestones to achieve durability and 
guarantee the functionality of the rule of law seemed a logical move to 
implement the negative lessons learned through previous enlargements. 
But for many of the indicators it remains unclear when exactly they are 
achieved. For example, one of the recommendations from the screening 
report of the European Commission for the Serbian judiciary reads: 
Establish a clear procedure of reaction for the High Judicial Council 
and the State Council of Prosecutors in situations of political infl uence 
on the work of the judiciary and the public prosecutor.44 
40 Marko Kmezic, ‘EU Rule of Law Conditionality: Democracy or “Stabilitocracy” Promotion 
in the Western Balkans?’ in  Dzankic, Keil and Kmezic (n 3) 93.
41 Asya Zhelyazkova and others, ‘European Union Conditionality in the Western Balkans: 
External Incentives and Europeanisation’ in Dzankic, Keil and Kmezic (n 3) 16.
42 Mendelski (n 7) 338.
43 ‘EU’s Benchmarking within Chapters 23 and 24 in Accession Negotiations with Serbia 
Effects and Challenges’ (European Policy Centre 2018) 6 <https://cep.org.rs/en/publica-
tions/eus-benchmarking-within-chapters-23-and-24-in-accession-negotiations-with-ser-
bia/> accessed 30 May 2020.
44 ‘First Draft of the Revised Action Plan for Chapter 23 − Judiciary’ (Ministry of Justice of 
Republic of Serbia 2019) <www.mpravde.gov.rs/fi les/Action%20plan%20Ch%2023.pdf > 
accessed 29 May 2020.
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The envisaged result of this recommendation is: 
In cases of political infl uence on the work of the judiciary, the High 
Judicial Council and the State Prosecutorial Council react under clear, 
predetermined guidelines. 
The indicators of achievement of the results have been defi ned as: 
Fundamentally reduced perception of political infl uence on the work of 
the judicial bodies among the bearers of judicial functions and among 
citizens.
Improved transparency of the work of the High Judicial Council and 
the State Prosecutorial Council and their collaboration with the media. 
Undoubtedly, the intentions here are clear: the judicial administra-
tion is to react when there are suspicions of undue political infl uence 
on the judiciary. Through its reaction, the administration will reinforce 
the trust of citizens in the independence and impartiality of the work 
of the judicial bodies. But if the main measurement offered for this is 
citizens’ perception, then we are facing the diffi cult task of connecting 
the acts (or lack thereof) of the judicial administration to the perception 
of citizens. The great anti-corruption campaigns tell us that the relati-
onship between trust and prosecution of political offences is not a one-
way street: an increased number of prosecutions does not necessarily 
lead to greater confi dence in the judicial organs. In fact, the experience 
of the three great judicially led anti-corruption campaigns of the last 
three decades − those conducted in Italy, Brazil, and Romania − tell us 
that even impressive top-down efforts to fi ght political corruption do not 
necessarily build trust in public institutions. Yet the focus of the capaci-
ty-building activities, the so-called ‘Twinning projects’, in which the best 
practices of various institutions in the EU would be translated into a di-
fferent setting, remained focused specifi cally on increasing the number 
of prosecutions started.45  
Thus, capturing change in behaviour or an understanding of so-
cietal norms regarding fairness or the perceptions of the judiciary is a 
task for which the indicators of global governance or country reports 
used by the EU in assessing the progress of candidate countries remain 
inadequate.46 
45 Mendelski (n 7) 334.
46 See Mila Versteeg and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Measuring the Rule of Law: A Comparison of In-
dicators’ (2017) 42(1) Law & Social Inquiry 100, arguing that while the indicators are not 
irrelevant what they capture is most likely a perception of impartiality and not necessarily 
the quality of the public institutions. 
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2.4 Specifi c policy solutions 
Following an institutionally based approach to the quality of rule of 
law meant that the quality of institutions and their regulatory capacity 
was one of the key areas of the promotion of the rule of law. But some of 
the policy solutions applied were either not tested for their signifi cance 
or produced results that would merely substitute one locus of power for 
another. For example, a specifi c mode of court administration replaced 
the existing model under which judges were appointed by the national 
parliaments and vetted by the national ministries of justice in almost all 
new EU Member States, as well as in the WB6 countries.47 This model, 
however, showed itself unable to secure the independence of the judicia-
ry. In the post-2004 EU Member States, the councils were by and lar-
ge constituted in an independent manner, but found themselves under 
attack by populist governments.48 Thus, as I have argued, they served 
the purpose of containing increasing state capture, though not its ove-
rall suppression. In the WB6, no such frontal assault on the councils ha-
ppened because the councils gradually became controlled by the politi-
cal elites (for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia), 
while they preserved their independence but remained largely powerless 
in the other four WB6 states. The EU did not respond to this by focusing 
on other aspects of rule of law promotion efforts, but by tightening the 
conditions for the evaluation of the work of the councils. A comparison 
of the country reports reveals increased focus on matters related to the 
judicial administration with many new concerns, such as the quality of 
testing of judges or their education, which were not even raised in the 
pre-2004 enlargement.49
Much faith was also put in the political parties fi nancing regulati-
on that was, together with confl ict-of-interest legislation, to prevent the 
exercise of undue infl uence in the public sphere. But the limits of such 
legislation soon became obvious. Legislation was evaded through the 
usage of several fi rms controlled by the same person who would make 
donations below the legal limit. In cases where the limits were excee-
47 Michal Bobek and David Kosař, ‘Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in 
Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2014) 15(7) German Law Journal 1257.
48 For an overview of the measures that the government of Poland has taken against the 
independence of the Polish judiciary, see Joint Urgent Opinion of the Venice Commission 
and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Eu-
rope on Amendments to the Law on the Common Courts, the Law on the Supreme Court, 
and Some Other Laws (2020) <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pd-
ffi le=CDL-PI(2020)002-e> accessed 29 May 2020.
49 Commission, Serbia 2019 Report Accompanying the Document Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions (2019) COM(2019) 260, 16-17. 
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ded, the parties were frequently punished, as in Bosnia50 and in Serbia, 
but the practice of courts and administrative bodies to issue minimum 
mandatory fi nes undermined the credibility of the process. In addition, 
the parties had been left with so many other opportunities for the exer-
cise of undue infl uence that this set of regulations did not really matter 
much.51 Thus, the legislation did not succeed in instilling trust in the 
political parties and in political representation itself. This had important 
consequences, as it undermined faith in democracy and the political en-
gagement of citizens.52 
This increase in imprecise and misguided conditionality did not 
only − as pointed out earlier − fail to tackle state capture but also led to 
two important problems. One was the aforementioned fake compliance, 
and the other was the usage of the rule of law as an element of discourse 
on European enlargement.   
2.5 Usage of the rule of law as an element of discourse 
By invoking the rule of law, one signals a commitment to a fair or-
dering of society. As Rajagopal observes, this is ‘a desire to escape from 
politics by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical’.53 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present all the instances of such 
invocations made by the European Commission’s offi cials or EU Member 
States’ diplomats aimed at both the general public and the WB6 leaders, 
but there is substantial evidence of widespread rhetorical practice.54
50 Jasmin Hasic and Mahir Sijamija, ‘Stable and State Subsidized Party Membership in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in Sergiu Gherghina, Alexandra Iancu and Sorina Soare (eds), 
Party Members and Their Importance in Non-EU Countries (Routledge 2018).  
51 For an explanation of bypassing party regulation, see Gorana Misic, ‘Do Regulations Mat-
ter? Impact of Political Financing Regulations on Party Corruption in Croatia and Serbia’ 
(Central European University 2018) <https://dsps.ceu.edu/sites/pds.ceu.hu/fi les/attach-
ment/basicpage/478/misicgoranapp-dissertation2018.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020.  
52 For example, we observe the decline or stagnation of all WB6 countries in the Freedom 
House ‘Freedom in the World Index’ available at <https://freedomhouse.org/> accessed 30 
May 2020. Also, for the loss of trust in public institutions in the WB6, see Marta Kolczyn-
ska, ‘Trust in Democratic Institutions in Western Balkans’ in Predrag Cveti anin and Ana 
Birešev (eds), Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkan Societies (Institut za Filozofi ju 
i Društvenu Teoriju 2012).
53 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Confl ict Rebuilding: A Critical 
Examination’ (2007) 49 William. & Mary Law Review 1347.
54 Part of this is a result of the rule of law revival and defence trend that can be observed 
in the EU ever since 1993 and its promotion to the former communist countries. An over-
view of this is offered in Ronald Janse, ‘Why Did the Rule of Law Revive?’ (2019) 11 Hague 
Journal of Rule of Law 341. For an exemplary statement of an EU Member State offi cial in 
this sense, see ‘Dialogue is a Powerful Solution’ (CorD 29 October 2019) <https://cordmag-
azine.com/country-in-focus/austria/wolfgang-sobotka-national-council-austria> accessed 
30 May 2020: ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law Must Be Irreversibly Anchored in the Minds 
and Hearts of the People of the Western Balkans’ (emphasis added). For an overview of the 
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The rather liberal presentation of the rule of law that would cure all 
problems of the WB6 countries evolved into something of a rhetorical pa-
nacea. Far from being a unique feature of the EU integration process of 
the WB6, such a move is something that is recorded globally and is used 
for various purposes: to denote the corruption of a regime, to promote 
economic reforms,55 to advocate for better human rights protection,56 and 
to advance security.57 
Such invocations of the rule of law are not misplaced. Indeed, the 
rule of law is important to achieve all the goals mentioned. But reducing 
the modernisation that EU membership brings to the WB6 countries 
to the rule of law and the need to attain it is counterproductive. First, 
such a stance makes all other issues of EU integration less relevant. 
The EU’s acquis has 35 chapters and, while they do not cover all legal 
norms that a country has, they are certainly crucial for alignment with 
the EU standards in diverse areas such as environmental protection, 
agriculture, and public procurement. Second, in situations where such 
invocations are made without a commitment or an action to change the 
‘stabilitocracy’ paradigm, they might be counterproductive to a rule of 
law constituency or considered meaningless by the authoritarian regi-
mes. The value of such invocations is to be judged based not on how often 
they appear but on whether they lead to concrete actions that challenge 
the state of the rule of law. 
3 Missing rule of law promotion strategies and approaches 
In the previous section, I demonstrated the main paradox of the ‘sta-
bilitocracy’ paradigm; as rule of law conditionality expands, so does sta-
te capture in the WB6. As we have seen, various factors − such as policy 
failures and the discursive practices detached from rule of law promotion 
efforts − contribute to such a development to a different extent. This le-
aves state capture processes free to dismantle what is left of the rule of 
law and democratic constitutionalism in the WB6. Therefore, a rule of 
invocations of the rule of law in the EU’s strategic documents concerning enlargement, see 
(n 26) and Council of the EU, ‘EU − Western Balkans Justice and Home Affairs ministerial 
forum - joint press statement’ (Press release, 19 November 2019) <www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/19/eu-western-balkans-justice-and-home-affairs-
ministerial-forum-joint-press-statement/> accessed 30 May 2020.  
55 Joel M Ngugi, ‘Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: Rule of Law as an Enabling and Restrictive 
Discourse’ (2005) 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
514.
56 Clair Apodaca, ‘The Rule of Law and Human Rights’ (200 4) 87(6) Judicature 292.
57 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union: Putting the Security 
into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2004) 29 European Law Review <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2458546> accessed 30 May 2020.
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law-promotion model that aims to engage with state capture is a rule of 
law model that should aim to replace the current aimless expansion of 
conditionality.
In this sense, I fi nd Humphreys’ analogy between a morality play 
staged in a theatre and rule of law promotion particularly useful.58 
Humphreys conceptualises rule of law promotion as a play in which the 
main actors are the judicial bodies, civil society, and the reform consti-
tuency who − despite their occasional tensions − fi ght on the same side. 
With the help of the international community, they perform a series of di-
ffi cult tasks in order to create a better environment for the economy and 
more opportunities for the poor. The ‘bad guys of the story’ − authorita-
rian politicians, corrupt actors, and ineffi cient governance agents − are 
disempowered through the concerted effort of actors. In the middle of the 
play, it becomes evident that the ordeals suffered by the protagonists are 
important not only for the liberation of the state from capture, but also 
because the struggle helps their societies in integrating into the global 
market of capital and goods. The moral of the story is that through hard 
work and sacrifi ce, positive changes can be made. While the depiction 
may sound humorous or even cynical, it is very much in line with reality. 
It is a crude, but relatively accurate, map of rule of law promotion which 
− depending on the context − identifi es the forces that represent a rule of 
law constituency that may possess the political will needed for reforms. 
Consequentially, this constituency represents the demand side of rule 
of law promotion, while the conditionality and the technical expertise of 
the EU experts represent the supply side.59 It is through the repetition 
of this play that the shortcomings and unstated assumptions about the 
functioning of a legal and political system of a society are exposed and 
that true reform, one that relies on acknowledging the importance of the 
political will of the actors, becomes possible.
With this in mind, I will try to offer a reconceptualisation of the 
rule of law promotion approach by highlighting four elements that have 
proven their worth in the creation of a rule of law constituency, elements 
that have remained neglected, by exposing their potential and shortco-
mings. I argue that relying on these alternatives is necessary to change 
the paradigm of rule of law promotion and lead to change in existing 
practices.      
58 Stephen Humphreys, Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention in The-
ory and Practice (CUP 2010) 24.
59 Hammergren (n 6) 29-32.
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3.1 Legal mobilisation 
Legal mobilisation is an approach to rule of law promotion that fi nds 
its modern expression in the lobbying and advocacy activities of civil so-
ciety organisations, lobbying groups, political parties, and transnational 
actors that mobilise the citizenry either through collective action or by 
enabling them to challenge public authority.60 Such actions were often 
tied to transnational networks of civil society organisations (CSOs) that 
have transferred some if their knowledge and expertise to local organi-
sations in the WB6. Still, many civil society organisations in the region 
have legally represented migrants, exposed corruption, provided legal 
aid, and produced policy proposals on important questions concerning 
the maintenance of the rule of law. Despite their donor orientation, these 
organisations are not without knowledge on how to conduct a mobilisati-
on campaign that would reach out to the general population that rema-
ins in demand of good governance.61
In its operations in the WB6, the EU has reached out to civil society 
organisations as well as think tanks in an attempt to better understand 
the ‘situation on the ground’, but it is hard to pinpoint the effect that 
this has had on strengthening the rule of law or the integration project 
itself. Civil society organisations have failed to mobilise society towards 
rule of law values, acting instead as epistemic communities that disse-
minate knowledge and expertise.62 This has not been without any value; 
for example, in Kosovo and Serbia this has led to a remaking of whistle-
blower legislation.63 But due to their (usually) foreign sources of funding, 
the CSOs have − especially in Serbia − often been labelled as foreign 
agents,64 and their reach remains limited to urban centres and the users 
of social networks. Recent trends in donor support towards democratic 
accountability demonstrate a turn to independent news organisations 
60 Frances K Zemans, ‘Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political 
System’ (1983) 77(3) American Political Science Review 690.
61 ‘Corruption in the Western Balkans: Bribery as Experienced by the Population’ (United 
Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime 2011) <www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analy-
sis/statistics/corruption/Western_balkans_corruption_report_2011_web.pdf> accessed 30 
May 2020.
62 For an example of how civil society organisations operate in this sense in Kosovo, see 
Jacob Phillips, ‘The Role of Epistemic Communities: Local Think Tanks, International Prac-
titioners and Security Sector Reform in Kosovo’ (2018) 18 Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies 281.
63 Nedim Hogic, ‘Whistleblower Protection in Kosovo: What Role for Collective Action?’ in 
Ioannis Armakolas and others (eds), Local and International Determinants of Kosovo’s State-
hood (The Kosovo Foundation for Open Society 2019) 37.
64 Sladjana DankoviÊ and Paula Pickering, ‘Public Scepticism of Internationally Supported 
Civil Society Organisations: Norms, Citizen Priorities, and Local Groups in Post-Socialist 
Serbia’ (2017) 33(2) East European Politics 210.
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and outlets, which have blossomed in the WB6 region in the past decade. 
While their reporting has − due to its exposure of corruption and infor-
mal networks − caused many a headache among the ruling elites, an 
assessment of their impact remains inconclusive. The donor logic seems 
to operate under the presumption that voter information is a key factor 
in reaching a decision on who to support in the elections. But a growing 
body of literature from the fi eld of political science demonstrates that the 
involvement of party leaders in fraud, bribery, voter intimidation, and vi-
olence does not necessarily reduce their electoral support.65 In the situa-
tion where the exposure of citizens to information on corruption leads to 
a reduction of this support, it is the novelty of such data or the innovative 
way in which they are presented that are key factors for success.66 There-
fore, the donor community should focus on supporting those civil society 
organisations that are willing and able to engage in legal mobilisation.
CSOs should focus on the documentation and evidence of the vio-
lations of law that arise out of activities of the political machines ope-
rated by the parties. This would involve electoral fraud, employer rights 
violations, negative media campaigns, and discrimination exercised in 
order to enforce state capture. Such changes of focus would require a 
change to the existing policy of the EU’s support of CSOs. The current 
framework governing support to the civil society sector as a whole rema-
ins vague and is focused on their sustainability and involvement in deci-
sion-making processes and not on their work.67 While individual donors, 
such as Member States, might cater for different needs, it is a change of 
the overreaching strategy that is necessary. This is not impossible, nor 
does the region’s limited tradition of social engagement − often quoted as 
limiting options for the more successful engagement of individuals68 − 
present an insurmountable task. The success stories, such as the legal 
mobilisations that have led to an increase in the rights and freedom of 
assembly of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) populati-
65 Alberto Chong and others, ‘Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the 
Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice and Participation’ (2015) 
77(1) Journal of Politics 55.
66 Claudio Ferraz and Federico Finan, ‘Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil’s 
Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes’ (2008) 123(2) Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 703.
67 DG Enlargement, ‘Guidelines for EU Support to Civil Society in Enlargement Coun-
tries, 2014-2020’ (June 2015) <http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Guide-
lines-for-EU-support-to-civil-society-in-enlargement-countries-2014-2020.pdf> accessed 
30 May 2020.
68 For example, see a rather gloomy perspective of cultural backwardness as a cause of 
low social engagement in Goran Zeravcic, ‘Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in 
BiH’ (EPRD 2016) 49 <http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Mapping-study-
of-CSOs-in-BiH.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020.
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on, provide evidence that such mobilisation is possible.69 This mobilisa-
tion would send a message that there is a strong network of lawyers and 
experts willing to challenge the steps taken against those victimised by 
the ruling regimes, and would require no legislative action since all me-
asures undertaken against individuals are illegal under the laws of the 
WB6 countries. In addition, many watchdog CSOs that conduct extensi-
ve monitoring activities could easily extend their operations to this fi eld 
and contribute their expertise to legal mobilisation.
3.2 Institutional strengthening with a specifi c focus
Institutions, their work, and quality are essential to the rule of law. 
Therefore, much of the effort in rule of law building and the fi ght against 
corruption focuses on institution building. In the WB6 region, this pro-
cess commenced from the early 2000s, leading to the creation of legal 
institutions that closely follow those in the new EU Member States. For 
example, all countries in the region have established judicial and pro-
secutorial councils as institutions separated from the other branches of 
government, or numerous independent oversight bodies. But unlike the 
institutions in the new EU Member States that were staffed in an inde-
pendent manner, many of the institutions created in the WB6 countries 
− while following the same institutional blueprint − were captured. Thus, 
the process of their creation ran parallel to the simultaneous process of 
pressures on these institutions from the political elites.70 Thus, in North 
Macedonia, an illegal system of wiretapping organised by the government 
of Nikola Gruevski was weaponised against his political opponents.71 A 
dramatic decline in the prosecution of grand corruption was recorded in 
Bosnia in the 2011-2019 period,72 and an all-out attack on independent 
institutions has been one of the main features of the government of Alek-
sandar Vucic in Serbia.73 Instances of dramatic whistleblowing expo-
sures of corrupt dealings in Kosovo have failed to mobilise any adequate 
reaction from institutions.
It is of essential importance that the institutions key to rule of law 
promotion regain credibility. But as I described in the previous section, 
69 Safi a Swimelar, ‘LGBT Rights in Bosnia: The Challenge of Nationalism in the Context of 
Europeanization’ (2019) Nationalities Papers 1.
70 Bieber (n 3) 82.
71 Sabrina P Ramet, ‘Macedonia’s Post-Yugoslav Reality: Corruption, Wiretapping, and Sto-
len Elections’ in Sabrina P Ramet, Christine M Hassenstab, Ola Listhaug (eds), Building 
Democracy in the Yugoslav Successor States, Accomplishments, Setbacks, Challenges since 
1990 (CUP 2017) 287.
72 Keil (n 35) 66.
73 Branko RadeljiÊ ‘Tolerating Semi-authoritarianism? Contextualising the EU’s Relation-
ship with Serbia and Kosovo’ in DžankiÊ, Keil and KmeziÊ (n 3) 157.
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setting unrealistic goals in terms of trustworthiness is hardly a winning 
formula. A more sensible approach would be a shift towards activities 
that focus on reputation-seeking and reputation-building activities for 
their leaders.74 For example, a comparative overview of the work of an-
ti-corruption agencies in the region reveals that leadership based on re-
putational prestige in the institutions is an element that serves to protect 
them from undue political infl uence.75 Strengthening external support 
for these situations may lead to more reputation-seeking activities un-
dertaken by the leaders of these institutions. Such was the case with 
Romania; strong external support favoured the activities of the leading 
anti-corruption public prosecutor Laura Kövesi. Additionally, support for 
lower ranking offi cials may be granted through more insistence on the 
enforcement of whistleblower legislation that would allow them to report 
on misuses of public power.
In this sense, the model of the so-called ‘Priebe report’ can serve as 
a tool for focusing institutional tasks that would prevent state capture. 
The Priebe reports, named after a former EU Commission Director, have 
mapped the scope of state capture in North Macedonia76 that served to 
prioritise the actions needed for the state to fi ght capture.77 These re-
ports precisely described all the actions needed to return control of the 
captured institutions, in this case the national security agency of North 
Macedonia, to democratically elected and appointed institutions and re-
store integrity to the electoral process.78 Tailor-made reports for each 
74 For the function of reputation-seeking activities in administrative agencies, see Daniel P 
Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innova-
tion in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton University Press 2001) and for their value 
in more effi cient judicial making, see Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputa-
tion: A Comparative Theory (University of Chicago Press 2015).
75 Slobodan Tomic, Explaining Enforcement Patterns of Anticorruption Agencies: Compara-
tive Analysis of Five Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian Anticorruption Agencies (London 
School of Economics 2016) <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3370/1/Tomic_Explaining_Enforce-
ment_Patterns.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020. 
76 ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recommendations of the Senior Experts’ 
Group on Systemic Rule of Law Issues Relating to the Communications Interception Re-
vealed in Spring 2015’ <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/
fi les/news_corner/news/news-fi les/20150619_recommendations_of_the_senior_experts_
group.pdf> accessed 29 May 2020.
77 However, the Priebe Report issued for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2019 was much less 
clear in the sense that it focused on variables such as trust and culture instead of concrete 
steps that need to be taken to address the crisis within the BiH judiciary. See Harmut 
Rank and Mahir Muharemovic, Bosnien und Herzegowina: ‘Priebe’-Bericht erschienen (Kon-
rad Adenauer Stiftung 2020) <https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/7938566/Bos-
nien+und+Herzegowina%2C+Priebe-Bericht+erschienen.pdf/97343b8c-671c-b8bc-2415-
51acf758487d?version=1.1&t=1578325474590> accessed 25 November 2020.
78 Commission, Urgent Reform Priorities for The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/news_corner/
news/news-fi les/20150619_urgent_reform_priorities.pdf > accessed 30 May 2020.
217CYELP 16 [2020] 197-223
of these countries would serve as a complementary tool to the progress 
reports and Commission opinions, which are often technical, imprecise, 
and unclear,79 with a tendency to underestimate the specifi c rule of law 
challenges.80 
3.3 Politicisation of anti-corruption
The systemic nature of corruption in the WB6 countries is also a 
style of governance of the political projects present therein. Evidence 
from the region, as well as from the EU, suggests that rule of law back-
sliding strongly correlates to the existence of an illiberal project run by 
a political party in power, ie, in Serbia by the SNS, in Bosnia the SNSD, 
and in North Macedonia the VMRO.81 Operating under the previously 
described model of ‘stabilitocracy’, the EU never engaged in a project to 
undermine the authority of the specifi c political leaders, considering this 
to be an infringement of sovereignty.82 On the contrary, when the former 
PM of North Macedonia, Nikola Gruevski, fl ed the country facing charges 
of misuse of public funds, he found asylum in Hungary, an EU Member 
State.83 While the mass prosecution of those organising illegal activities 
is a desirable course of action, we must observe that the chances of 
such an outcome remain slim. Major anti-corruption campaigns such as 
those in Romania, Italy, or Brazil have emerged as reputation-seeking 
activities of the prosecutors and judges. In the absence of preconditions 
for such activities from the judges and prosecutors we are to look to the 
legal and political alternatives to these events that may lead to a corrup-
tion-reducing outcome.
79  Marovic, Kmezic and Prelec (n 10) 35-37.
80 It seems that a lack of a uniform methodology focuses on issues seen to be different with 
respect to which ‘team of writers’ covers which areas. For example, the country report for 
Serbia in 2018 recognises corruption in education as a problem, yet the report for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for the same year does not, despite the presence of a signifi cant number of 
so-called ‘degree mills’ in both countries. See Commission, Communication Staff Working 
Document, Serbia 2019 Report COM (2019) 260 fi nal; Commission, Commission Opinion 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (Commu-
nication) COM (2019) 261 fi nal.
81 Laurent Pech and Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism within: Rule of Law Backsliding in 
the EU’ (2017) 19 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 3.
82 Srdja Pavlovic, ‘West Is Best: How “Stabilitocracy” Undermines Democracy Building in 
the Balkans’ (LSE European Politics and Policy Blog, 5 May 2017) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
europpblog/2017/05/05/west-is-best-how-stabilitocracy-undermines-democracy-buil-
ding-in-the-balkans/> accessed 30 May 2020.
83 Sinisa Jakov Marusic, ‘Macedonia’s Gruevski Gets Hungary Asylum, Alleges Murder Plot’ 
(Balkan Insight, 20 November 2018) <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/11/20/macedo-
nia-s-gruevski-accuses-of-assassination-plot-11-20-2018/> accessed 30 May 2020.
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We fi nd an example of such process in the political events of Slovakia 
of the 1990s. An often-overlooked episode of its fi ght against state capture 
from the late 1990s sheds light on creative uses of both conditionality and 
support for CSOs as elements of an effective strategy in this sense. Unlike 
other Eastern European countries that were EU candidates during the 
late 1990s, Slovakia was considered ‘a black hole in the heart of Euro-
pe’84 because of its backlog in EU integration caused by the authoritarian 
style of government promoted by the then-political leader Vladimir Meciar. 
Between 1993 and 1998, Slovakia’s public administration grew by 73% 
with almost all the new appointees coming from Meciar’s HDZS (Move-
ment for Democratic Slovakia) party.85 The populist and nationalist poli-
cies of Meciar led to confrontation-style politics with the unfair targeting 
of both neighbouring countries and domestic political opponents.
While the credit for his removal rests with the Slovak people, it was 
the support received through foreign assistance that strengthened po-
pular mobilisation against a regime that exhibited many features of sta-
te capture. This support primarily meant technical assistance to CSOs 
that were skilled in mobilising voter turnout for the 1998 elections and 
that managed to infl uence the media with pro-EU sentiment.86
Later analysis also demonstrated that the problem of corruption in 
Slovakia was overstated87 and that Slovakia as a whole was often unfa-
irly equated with Meciar.88 Be that as it may, after Meciar lost the 1999 
presidential elections, a coalition of civil society organisations assisted 
the government with the promotion of business-friendly legislation, tax 
reform, strengthening of the rule of law, and democratic consolidation. 
However, Slovakia prosecuted a signifi cantly lower number of public of-
fi cials than any other Eastern European country.89 Despite this, Slovak 
citizens affi rmed their low tolerance of corruption in the aftermath of the 
Jan Kuciak affair, with mass demonstrations that led to the collapse of 
the government of Robert Fico and the election of a liberal president. Part 
of the reason for this was resilience to corruption that was built into the 
Slovak society through the anti-Meciar struggle.   
84 Rastislav Kacer and Marian Tupy, ‘Out of the Black Hole’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 
17 February 2005).
85 Valerie J Bunce, Sharon L Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist 
Countries (CUP 2011) 53-84.
86  ibid, 77. 
87 Nicolle Gallina, ‘Anti-Corruption Revisited: The Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia’ 
(2013) 7(1) Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 183.
88 Karen Henderson, ‘The Slovak Republic: Explaining Defects in Democracy’ (2004) 11(5) 
Democratization 133.
89 Maria Popova and Vincent Post, ‘Prosecuting High-Level Corruption in Eastern Europe’ 
(2018) 51(3) Communist and Post-Communist Studies 231.
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A full replication of the Slovak strategy wherein pro-European and 
pro-EU forces were mobilised in one camp with the clear goal of defeating 
an authoritarian government would not necessarily end corruption and 
other challenges to the establishment of the rule of law. But there is no 
doubt that a campaign joining the forces of the EU and civil society, poli-
tical life, and institutions with such goals would be a promising starting 
point. The emergence of local actors with a clear anti-corruption agenda, 
such as the North Macedonian government in 2017 and the short-lived 
2019 Canton Sarajevo government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, demon-
strates that a lot can be achieved over a short period of time. The EU 
would clearly support those forces in favour of the rule of law as a tool for 
ordering societies in a liberal-democratic tradition.90
Without such measures, the current rule of law promotion program-
me of the EU is essentially confi ned to incremental reforms. Such re-
forms are not without value, as they change the corruption equilibrium 
in a society, yet they lack the potential to ignite an anti-corruption cam-
paign and policy reforms that have failed in the WB6 countries while be-
ing successful in the Eastern enlargement of 2004. Part of the reason for 
their success was that the Eastern enlargement represented what in the 
anti-corruption literature is known as the ‘big-bang effect’91 − namely, an 
all-out reform targeting each democratic institution in the country. The 
effect of these reforms was greatly reinforced by the sense of urgency and 
optimism about enlargement which prompted a swift en masse adoption 
and application of the acquis without the numerous action plans that 
are the norm of the enlargement process today. A change of behaviour 
among political actors (but also among ordinary citizens who were mobi-
lised through rapid political and legal action) reconfi gured the equilibri-
um of corruption. This is because corruption is self-reinforcing behavio-
ur, which means that high levels of corruption create a ‘high corruption 
trap’ that cannot easily be escaped through incremental reforms.92 By 
supporting political alternatives to the existing state capture and by im-
plementing these measures, the EU could help replicate elements of the 
big-bang enlargement approach.
90 Cf Marovic, Kmezic and Prelec (n 10) 8.
91 Bo Rothstein, ‘Anti-corruption: The Indirect “Big Bang” Approach’ (2011) 18(2) Review of 
International Political Economy 228. 
92 An excellent discussion of the differences between the two approaches is offered in Mat-
thew Stephenson, ‘Corruption as a Self-Reinforcing “Trap”: Implications for Reform Strate-
gy’ (2019) 10 Working Paper Series Quality of Government Institute Gothenburg, <https://
qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1737/1737653_2019_10_stephenson.pdf> accessed 30 May 
2020.
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3.4 Looking beyond law and politics
As Bugaric has demonstrated,93 the rule of law in Central and Ea-
stern Europe has been built simultaneously with democratic institutions 
and free markets. One of the main axioms of this project was that the 
rule of law helps economic development by promoting investors’ securi-
ty, stability, and dispute adjudication, thus creating a better business 
climate. As such, it was heavily promoted by the international fi nancial 
institutions such as the World Bank.94 But could it also be that the rule 
of law is strengthened by economic development? Some relatively recent 
empirical fi ndings show a correlation between economic development 
and the lowering of corruption rates.95 This is explained by the success 
of the private sector in, at least partially, breaking free from the chains 
of state capture and thus lowering societal dependency on corrupt po-
litical machines. Sociological inquiries into the problem of corruption 
have unearthed a reversal of the maxim that economic growth cannot 
happen in a corrupt environment. On the contrary, economic growth ha-
ppens despite the heavy price of systemic corruption.96 If we understand 
corruption as one of the main challenges to the rule of law − as the EU 
rule of law promotion strategies do − then a reduction in corruption rates 
could alleviate at least some of the pressures on the establishment of 
rule of law standards.
This is because the prevalence of corruption in the WB6 is not rein-
forced only by the existing patrimonial, particularistic, and, essentially, 
broken system but also by the scarcity of resources. For example, the re-
latively low payment of health professionals in the WB6 may be an incen-
tive for corrupt behaviour. Experiments and studies have demonstrated 
that the victims of corruption are often the poor97 and that corruption 
and inequality may create a high corruption equilibrium that is hard to 
93 Bojan Bugaric, ‘The Rule of Law Derailed: Lessons from the Post-Communist World’ 
(2015) 7 Hague Journal of Rule of Law 175.
94 Tor Krever, ‘The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law and the World 
Bank’s Development Model’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 287.
95 Jie Bai and others, ‘Does Economic Growth Reduce Corruption? Theory and Evidence 
from Vietnam’ (2013) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19483 <www.
nber.org/papers/w19483.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020.
96 Luca Uberti, ‘The “Sociological Turn” in Corruption Studies: Why Fighting Graft in the 
Developing World is Often Unnecessary and Sometimes Counterproductive’ (2016) 16(3) 
Progress in Development Studies 261.
97 Many studies demonstrate that corrupt exchanges disproportionately target the poor. 
For example, see Brian Fried, Paul Lagunes and Atheendar Venkataramani, ‘Corruption 
and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in 
Latin America’ (2010) 45(1) Latin American Research Review 76.
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break.98 Thus, a rise in living standards and economic development co-
uld lower incentives for corruption.
Surely, the EU cannot be accountable for the economic development 
of the non-member states, nor does it have a mandate for structural or 
fi scal interventions in non-member states. But it is important that it re-
cognises the role that economic development may play in reducing oppor-
tunities for corrupt behaviour. To a certain extent, the EU recognised 
the importance of such a view in its Western Balkans enlargement stra-
tegy adopted in 2018. This strategy envisages investment in the develop-
ment of infrastructure and digital connectivity, as well as the creation 
of better conditions for the operation of small and medium enterprises.99 
This translates into more Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
funds and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
loans for these sectors. However, reliance on development funds and lo-
ans is not only insuffi cient as a trigger for the desired transformation, 
but also creates a risk of strengthening the existing state capture. Na-
mely, the funds coming from these sources end up either in state funds 
or in public infrastructure projects that present a high risk for corrupti-
on.100 Another approach, seen in the recent change in the EU accession 
process methodology, is that, as the rule of law takes centre stage, access 
to funds for improving various sectors is tied to progress in the rule of 
law.101
Additionally, the EU should consider direct fi nancial intervention 
in terms of low credit loans into those sectors of the economy that it 
considers of strategic importance to its development, such as the digi-
tal industry and agricultural production. Such loans would help bypass 
the main obstacle to the effi cient functioning of development funds and 
they would increase independence from the state of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). A cross-cutting approach that intersects with legal 
98 Eric Uslaner, ‘Corruption, Inequality, and Trust’ in Gert Tindgaard Svendsen and Gun-
nar Lind Haase Svendsen (eds), The Handbook of Social Capital: The Troika of Sociology, 
Political Science and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009).
99 See Commission, ‘A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement 
with the Western Balkans COM(2018) 65 fi nal, 5. 
100 This is particularly true in North Macedonia and Bosnia where only 17% and 18% of 
the funds are allocated for support of the private sector. See <https://www.ebrd.com/
ebrd-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina.html> and <https://www.ebrd.com/ebrd-in-north-mace-
donia.html> for details.
101 ‘Seven Stages of EU Accession: This is How France Would Reform the Process’ (Eu-
ropean Western Balkans, 18 November 2019) <https://europeanwesternbalkans.
com/2019/11/18/seven-stages-of-eu-accession-this-is-how-france-would-reform-the-
process/> accessed 30 May 2020; Non-Paper Reforming the European Union Accession 
Process <https://g8fi p1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/11/Enlargement-nonpaper.pdf> accessed 30 May 2020.
222 Nedim HogiÊ: The European Union’s Rule of Law Promotion in the Western Balkans...
mobilisation should complement the usage of these loans. SMEs should 
be encouraged to comply with procurement laws, report corruption, and 
adhere to corporate social responsibility standards. This would make le-
gal mobilisation less dependent on CSOs, thereby also helping to relieve 
them of the stigma of ‘foreign agents’. The EU could consider expanding 
its single market to the WB6 creating, a more integrated relationship 
with the candidate states, as was done with the European Free Trade 
Area in the 1990s.102 Such a proposal would not necessarily run against 
the current stream of thinking that strives to tie funds to the fulfi lment 
of the rule of law conditionality criteria.103 Rather, it aims to deconstru-
ct the understanding of funding as a ‘reward for compliance’, seeing it 
instead as a possible tool that can be used to assist in rule of law pro-
motion.
4 Conclusion 
Both the states that were outside the EU, such as the WB6, and the 
states that entered from 2007 onwards transited without transforming. 
This meant that the creation of liberal democratic institutions and re-
forms directed towards the creation of a free market were either not fully 
executed or did not prove themselves to be a panacea for the structural 
problems existing within society. Different results achieved in the cir-
cumstances of the earlier enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013 emp-
hasise that not all of the current failures in rule of law promotion may 
be explained by the lack of adoption and implementation of rule of law 
standards but that they are also a consequence of the pervasive state 
capture that the promotion fails to tackle.
This has led to the paradox of the increased robustness of rule of 
law conditionality that is not followed by an adequate strengthening of 
the rule of law. Despite the relatively longer period that the WB6 states 
and the EU have had to work out a more functional approach, this has 
not resulted in the overcoming of phenomena such as fake compliance 
with EU rule of law standards. 
Regardless of the EU’s future intentions concerning enlargement or 
quasi-membership status, rule of law promotion in the WB6 is not mea-
ningless. On the contrary, the activities may prevent further democratic 
backsliding, making the countries in question a more reliable partner 
to the EU in different fi elds of cooperation. Given the relatively long ti-
mespan over which they are evolving and the lack of leverage, such as 
membership, it can be said that what it has achieved so far is not to be 
102 European Stability Initiative (n 10) 14, 22.
103 For example, see Nozar (n 16) 3.
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downplayed. Certainly, the EU and its Member States will in the course 
of the enlargement process ultimately have to decide whether or not they 
consider that the WB6 states possess the required rule of law standards. 
An answer to this question, irrespective of whether it is affi rmative or 
negative, will have little sense without an attempt to promote the rule of 
law through strengthening rule of law constituency. Without such a de-
velopment, WB6 rulers will have an incentive to turn into unenlightened 
despots who will seek partnership in exchange for assistance in confl ict 
prevention. And the citizens themselves will seek refuge in the prospe-
ring EU countries rather than risk standing up to injustice. The mere 
reiteration of the importance of legalism built into the expansion of good 
governance conditionality will not challenge the paradigm of ‘stabilito-
cracy’.
In this paper, I have mapped the main general elements missing 
in the rule of law promotion approach, arguing why they would be use-
ful in confronting state capture. None of the approaches presented are 
completely new or revolutionary and all of them have weaknesses and 
limitations. What their application demands is not so much funds from 
European taxpayers, but a reframing of the past experiences of enlarge-
ment and rule of law promotion, as well as recognition that many of the 
successes depended on a variety of factors. This does not mean that the 
bar for the evaluation of rule of law standards should be set lower, but 
that a wider approach which takes into account the many dimensions of 
promotion should allow for a refocusing of the promotion project.
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